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Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
Bill C-83, Solitary Confinement, and Mental Health
LYDIA DOBSON
This article investigates the recently passed Bill C-83, which aims to reduce harms
caused by segregating people with mental health issues. In order to assess the capacity of
the Bill to support meaningful change, the history of mental health institutions and
correctional facilities in Ontario is first explored, followed by an analysis of recent cases
on segregation and mental health in the province. Next, legislative oversight for federal
prisons and provincial jails is described, followed by an overview of ongoing reforms.
Here, a distinction between federal prisons and provincial jails is made in order to
explore the different legislation governing each of these spaces and the complexities that
arise from multiple systems of governance. Finally, the practical implementation of Bill
C-83 is considered within these legal frameworks, and the resultant consequences are
suggested in light of academic research on prison law policy and reform.
“The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”
Fyodor Dostoevsky

IN DECEMBER OF 2018, AN INQUEST INTO THE DEATH of Cas Geddes commenced. Geddes,
who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, was detained by police for uttering threats and taken
to the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) after no beds could be made available in the
city’s mental health facility. As is often the case, when people living with mental health issues
are deemed dangerous and are unable to be properly supported by existing social services, police
resort to incarceration as a preventative measure to diminish the risk that may be presented by
the individual. Geddes was placed in administrative segregation (or solitary confinement)1
shortly after his arrival to OCDC, despite an existing Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Order
prohibiting the use of segregation for prisoners with diagnosed mental health issues.2 In the


Lydia Dobson is a prison abolitionist and founding member of the Toronto Prisoners’ Project and the
Criminalization and Punishment Education Project. She holds a Masters in Sociology from Carleton University and
is currently completing her third year of the JD program at Osgoode Hall Law School. As will become clear, there
have been significant developments in the regulation of the use of solitary confinement in Canada, particularly since
2013. The research for this article was largely completed by the spring of 2019, however updates on the status to the
two key Bills explored here are included, as well as an update on a significant decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal.
1
The terms “(administrative) segregation” and “solitary confinement” will be used interchangeably throughout this
article, despite “segregation” being the more widely accepted legal term. This is done intentionally in an effort to
resist the capacity for similar conditions of confinement to be re-branded under different legal names. This decision
was inspired by a question that arose in a legal conference on the issue, attended by a person who had been
incarcerated for many years: part way through a discussion on “segregation,” he asked whether the experts at the
table were talking about solitary confinement. If we cannot speak in terms accessible to those impacted by them, we
should question and adjust how we use them.
2
Ontario Human Rights Commission, Public Statement, “Segregation and mental health in Ontario’s prisons: Jahn v
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services” (25 August 2020), online: <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/segregationand-mental-health-ontario’s-prisons-jahn-v-ministry-community-safety-and-correctional> [perma.cc/9GGL-BD5J].
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hours following Geddes’ release from solitary confinement into the general population of the jail,
he died by suicide.3 Sadly, Geddes’ death is representative of an ongoing trend of human rights
violations in Ontario carceral institutions.4 Although past policy reforms have led to more
frequent mental health assessments for those in segregation, this added procedural layer has not
substantially changed the numbers of people with mental health issues being placed into
segregation.5 Rather, as some have argued, reforms of this nature may actually facilitate
legitimization of the use of solitary confinement for prisoners with mental health issues.6 Recent
publicity on this and other major cases in Canada7 has seen increased public pressure for more
drastic alternatives to segregation.8 To this end, a federal Bill (C-83), which received Royal
Assent on 21 June 2019, amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to “eliminate” the
use of administrative and disciplinary segregation. 9 While some experts have declared that the
amendments could, if implemented properly, “end solitary confinement in Canada,”10 others
have doubted their capacity for change, deeming the new reforms as having created conditions of
confinement which are simply “solitary by another name.”11
This article seeks to determine the capacity of the recently passed Bill C-83 to reduce
harms caused by segregating people with mental health issues and to examine the potential
consequences of the implementation of the Bill. In order to achieve this, the history of mental
health institutions and correctional facilities in Ontario is first explored, followed by an analysis
of recent cases on segregation and mental health in the province. Next, legislative oversight for
federal prisons and provincial jails is described, followed by an overview of ongoing reforms.
Here, a distinction between federal prisons, which house those who have received a sentence of
two years or longer, and provincial jails, which are used to detain people awaiting trial or serving
a sentence of less than two years, is made in order to explore the different legislation governing
each of these spaces. Notably, the majority of prisoners who are held in provincial jails (as was

Blair Crawford, “Mentally ill Geddes ‘thrown in with the wolves’ at Ottawa jail, inmate tells inquest,” Ottawa
Citizen (12 December 2018), online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/geddes-thrown-into-the-wolves-atottawa-jail-inmate-tells-inquest> [perma.cc/DXR6-2QTW].
4
Howard Sapers et al, “Segregation in Ontario: Independent Review of Ontario Corrections” (March 2017), online:
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/IndependentReviewOntarioCorrections/IndependentReviewOntario
CorrectionsSegregationOntario.html#seguse> [perma.cc/U856-4E97].
5
See Appendix A which outlines the reforms to the mental health oversight of persons in solitary confinement
introduced in 2013, and which are still in effect today. Note that Geddes’ death occurred under this regime.
Ongoing reports from OCDC demonstrate that the use of segregation has not, however decreased. See “OttawaCarleton
Detention
Centre
Quarterly
Reports”
(7
September
2018),
online:
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/OCDCTaskForceReportback.html> [perma.cc/EW9A-B3X2].
6
Justin Piché, “Bill C-83: The End of the Line for Segregation in Federal Penitentiaries in Canada?” Tracking the
Politics of Criminalization and Punishment in Canada (22 November 2018): <http://tpcpcanada.blogspot.com/2018/11/bill-c-83-end-of-line-for-segregation.html> [perma.cc/335G-VU76].
7
The Adam Capay case, Brazeau class action, and Christina Jahn decisions will be discussed in the following
section of this article, elaborating on these circumstances.
8
Piché, supra note 6.
9
C-83, An Act to amend the Correctional and Conditional Release Act and another Act, SC 2019, c27.
10
Lisa Kerr, “If implemented properly, new bill may end solitary confinement in Canada,” Globe and Mail (18
October 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-if-implemented-properly-new-bill-may-endsolitary-confinement-in/> [perma.cc/3JYP-9FLK].
11
Kim Pate, “Solitary by another name is just as cruel,” Globe and Mail (16 November 2018), online:
<sencanada.ca/en/sencaplus/opinion/solitary-by-another-name-is-just-as-cruel-senator-pate/>
[perma.cc/BWD84VV9].
3
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Geddes) are on remand, meaning that they are legally innocent and awaiting trial. 12 Finally, the
practical implementation of Bill C-83 is considered within these legal frameworks, and the
resultant consequences of these processes are suggested in light of academic research on prison
law policy and reform. Specifically, Bill 6, a transformative Bill for Ontario-based jail
governance, is assessed alongside the overlapping reforms of Bill C-83, impacting federal
Ontario-based prisons.

I. MENTAL HEALTH AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
In the early 1980s, a trend in deinstitutionalization of psychiatric and mental health facilities took
place across Canada. Although not without its own shortcomings, under the framework of
institutionalization, people diagnosed with mental health issues were far less likely to be
criminalized.13 Scholars have long since documented deinstitutionalization and the
“displacement of mental health cases into the criminal justice system.”14 Rather than providing
services that could support people living will mental health issues, government funds have been
increasingly directed towards carceral institutions used for punishment.15 The result is high rates
of mental health issues within Canadian prisons and jails.16 For example, in 2016, OCDC
reported that 50 per cent of women and 28 per cent of men entering the jail had been flagged
with mental health alerts.17 For the growing population of prisoners18 with mental health issues,
the use of solitary confinement is a pressing concern.19 Legal frameworks governing solitary
confinement in Ontario provide broad discretion with limited oversight.20 In provincial jails, for
12

For statistical data on remand facilities across Canada and an analysis of the causes and implications of the high
rates of pre-trial detention see: Statistics Canada, “Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2017/2018” (9
May 2019), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.html> [perma.cc/V8YHMGZA].
13
Many of the institutions which have long since been shut down continue to face litigation for abuses of mentally
ill persons which took place within them. See, e.g. Carol Goar, “Ugly secret of Ontario psychiatric hospitals won’t stay
hidden,” Toronto Star (13 December, 2013), online:
<www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/06/07/ugly_secret_of_ontario_psychiatric_hospitals_wont_stay_hidden_goar.
html> [perma.cc/2QG9-DMLF].
14
Sara Johnson, “Custodial Remand in Canada,” Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol 23, no 7
(2001), online: <publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0070385-002-XIE.pdf>.
15
For carceral expansion see the blog created by Professor Justin Piché, “Tracking Carceral Punishment in Canada,”
online: <tpcp-canada.blogspot.com> [perma.cc/5CYK-QUXC]. The blog investigates a myriad of issues, inclusive
of those related to mental health and punishment in Canada. For decreased funding of psychiatric facilities see e.g.
Cheryl Forchuk et al, “Housing, income support and mental health: Points of disconnection” (2007) 14:5 Health
Research Policy and Systems 2.
16
Sandy Simpson, “Mental Illness and the Prison System,” Centre for Addition and Mental Health (2019), online:
<www.camh.ca/en/camh-news-and-stories/mental-illness-and-the-prison-system> [perma.cc/BNQ8-SB2H].
17
Note that mental health alerts do not confirm a diagnosed illness. Rather, they are used to trigger a diagnostic
process. See Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre Quarterly Trends Analysis (6 June 2017), online:
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/OttawaCarletonDetentionCentreTaskForce/OCDCTaskForce–
QuarterlyTrendsAnalysis.html> [perma.cc/TVQ4-XLWF].
18
Advocates for prison abolition tend to use the term “prisoner” in place of “inmate” because the latter has its
origins in institutionalized psychiatric facilities and implies that people have an inherent quality in need of fixing.
The term prisoner in used in place of inmate to reject this ideology.
19
Diane Kelsall, “Cruel and usual punishment: solitary confinement in Canadian prisons” (2014) 186:18 CMAJ
1345.
20
Acts governing use of segregation are explored in more detail in the following section. Federal and provincial
legislation on administrative and punitive segregation agree on these points.
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example, anything that “in the opinion of the Superintendent” constitutes a safety concern is
sufficient to justify segregating prisoners.21 Under these regimes, people with mental health
issues are more likely to experience segregation. 22 Despite a large body of empirical data that
clearly indicates that solitary confinement is detrimental to mental health, segregation is a
common response to for prisoners at risk of self-harm.23 As the report of Howard Sapers, then
Ontario’s Independent Advisor of Corrections Reform noted, “[t]hose who have been flagged as
having potential or confirmed suicide risk or mental illness are disproportionately placed in
segregation, and once there tend to stay longer than the rest of the segregated population.”24
Further troubling are statistics that show that the average number of days spent in segregation for
both prisoners who have been flagged with mental health alerts and those who are at risk of
suicide was fifteen or higher.25 According to what is known as the “Mandela Rules” provided by
the United Nations, anything more than fifteen days of segregation amounts to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.26 Although the Canadian state was a member of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted the Mandela Rules, the rules yield no binding
consequence should Canada directly contravene them. Unfortunately, a lack of meaningful
oversight of incarceration in Canada has meant that many issues around the use of segregation
have not investigated until tragedies occurred. Some of the major cases on solitary confinement
that have shone the public spotlight on Ontario institutions are provided below in order to situate
the introduction of Bill C-83 within the contemporary socio-legal political landscape.

II. A DECADE OF ABUSE
Domestic and international pressures to address the ongoing harms of solitary confinement in
Ontario have been mounting for several years now. Starting with the tragic death of Ashley
Smith, major legal battles against the use of solitary confinement for prisoners with mental
health issues have frequented media headlines. 27 In this section, an overview of recent leading
cases and their impacts are discussed to provide an understanding of the path that has led towards
the introduction of Bill C-83 and the support for and opposition to it. For clarity, Appendix B
provides a timeline of these events.

21

Ministry of Correctional Services Act, RSO 1990, c M-22 at s 34.
Rachelle Laroque, “Segregation Literature Review,” Independent Review of Ontario Corrections (January 2017),
online:
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/sites/default/files/content/mcscs/docs/Segregation%20Literature%20Review%20ENGLI
SH%20FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/T42A-3DE9].
23
Sapers, supra note 4 and Ottawa Detention Quarterly, supra note 17.
24
Sapers, supra note 4.
25
Ibid.
26
For a more fulsome explanation on the Mandela Rules, see Part III Federal and Provincial Legislative Reforms,
also see The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)
online:
<www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf>
[perma.cc/3DA4-EYSR].
27
Although this article uses the Ashley Smith Inquest as a starting point to analyze ongoing issues of segregation
and mental health in Canada, this issue has been tackled by scholars and activists for many years prior to the Smith
Inquest. See Michael Jackson, “Reflection on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian Prisoners”
(2015) 4:1 Cdn J Hum Rts 57.
22
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Ashley Smith was a youth when she first became incarcerated in a Nova Scotia
correctional facility.28 Ashley suffered from mental health issues that were exacerbated by long
stays in solitary confinement and was eventually sent to Grand Valley Institution, a federal
prison in Ontario.29 While in a segregation there, Ashley died by suicide, as prison guards
watched through a camera. 30 They had been instructed not to enter the room until she was no
longer breathing.31 News of this event became public, sparking national media attention and an
inquest into her death.32 In 2013, the inquest rendered 104 recommendations, including banning
indefinite solitary confinement. 33
As the inquest into Ashley Smith’s death was concluding, a legal proceeding in a
different matter was brought against an Ontario jail. Christina Jahn, a woman living with mental
health issues and suffering from cancer, was subjected to more than 200 consecutive days in
solitary confinement.34 The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) intervened in her claim
against Ontario’s Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS), seeking a
consent order for public interest remedies.35 Due to Jahn’s eventual settlement with MCSCS,
many of the intimate details of her experience are not in the public record. However, a lengthy
consent order has been made public, which states the terms that outline how segregation may be
lawfully exercised.36 In the consent order, there are notable provisions that indicate that the
segregation of prisoners with mental health issues is prohibited and that no more than sixty
aggregate days of segregation is allowed in a 365-day period.37
Public attention to these and other events led to an independent review of Ontario
Corrections, concluding in what is now known as the Howard Sapers Report. In this 2017 report,
several recommendations, echoing those of the Jahn Settlement and Ashley Smith Inquest, are
provided. Most prominent of these recommendations are three points found in Recommendation
3.1 prohibiting the use of segregation for mentally ill prisoners, prohibiting placement in
segregation for more than fifteen days, and limiting aggregate days to no more than sixty in a
one-year period.38
Given the publicity of the Ashley Smith Inquest, the Jahn Settlement, and the Howard Sapers
Report, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the use of segregation for prisoners with
mental health issues in Ontario has since been eradicated. Unfortunately, however, at the
provincial level the Jahn Settlement Order was violated in 2017, which led to a subsequent 2018
order. Shortly thereafter, Bill 6 was introduced at the Ontario legislature and Bill C-83 was

Jennifer Kilty & Rebecca Bromwich, “Introduction: Law, Vulnerability, and Segregation: What Have We Learned
from Ashley Smith's Carceral Death?” (2017) 32:2 CJLS 157 at 158.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (19 December 2013). Note that due to procedural conflicts
the first inquest did not begin until 2011, and was eventually terminated.
34
Segregation and mental health in Ontario’s prisons: Jahn v Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Ontario Human
Rights Commission, online: <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/segregation-and-mental-health-ontario’s-prisons-jahn-v-ministry-community-safetyand-correctional> [perma.cc/G7B2-G4SX].
35
Ibid.
36
“Appendix A” depicts the oversight of segregation for mentally ill prisoners at ODCD, resulting from this order.
37
Public Interest Remedies: Schedule A in the matter of: Christina Nadine Jahn v Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of Ontario, As Represented By The Minister Of Community Safety And Correctional Services 24 September 2013.
38
Sapers, supra note 4.
28
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introduced into Parliament.39 Since the introduction of these two Bills, an inquest into the death
of Cas Geddes, a stay of proceedings for Adam Capay, and a class action brought forward be the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), have been at the forefront of media attention.
As the introduction of this article describes, Geddes was diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia when he was held in solitary confinement at OCDC, where he died by suicide in
February of 2017.40 A few months later, the public learned that Adam Capay, a youth at the time
he was first imprisoned, had been held in solitary confinement in a federal prison in Ontario for
more than four years.41 Less than a month later, in March of 2019, an Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General),(CCLA)
condemned the use of segregation for prisoners with mental health issues. Although the court
declined to issue a specific remedy on mental health,42 it did make an important declaration that
“administrative segregation longer than 15 consecutive days as provided for in ss. 31-37 of the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act violates s. 12 of the Charter and cannot be justified
under s. 1.”43 As a caveat to the Court’s conclusion, it accepted the Attorney General’s request
for a further extension of time to allow the legislative process with respect to Bill C-83 to
conclude.44 This was significant because it was the first instance where the Ontario Court of
Appeal had explicitly acknowledged the harms of fifteen consecutive days of segregation, in
agreement with the well-established Mandela Rules, mentioned briefly above and discussed
more fully in the following section.

III. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
As the above cases illustrate, both federal prisons and provincial jails in Ontario are experiencing
substantial pressures to reform or abolish solitary confinement in its current form, particularly for
prisoners with mental health issues. Arguably, one of the barriers to actualizing change in
Canadian carceral institutions is the existence of parallel but disparate legislative powers
governing them. In this section, differing approaches to legislative reform in federal and
provincial institutions in Ontario are contrasted against the backdrop of international law. 45
As outlined in the introductory section, federal prisons operate to incarcerate those
sentenced to more than two years and provincial jails are used to house those awaiting trial or
who are sentenced to less than two years on incarceration. The majority (69 per cent) of those
detained in Ontario jails are held on remand, awaiting trial. 46 The notable results of this two39

Bill C-83, supra note 9.
Crawford, supra note 3.
41
Patrick White, “Judge issues stay in case of Adam Capay, who spent years in solitary confinement,” Globe and
Mail (28 January, 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-judge-issues-stay-in-adam-capaycase/> [perma.cc/N4RN-SLAK].
42
2019 ONCA 243 at para 66. An appeal by the Attorney General of Canada to the Supreme Court of Canada was
subsequently abandoned.
43
Ibid at para 150.
44
Ibid at para 47.
45
Jails hold those serving less than two years, but they also hold all prisoners awaiting sentencing which means that
all prisoners spend time in a jail. All prisoners in Canada will spend time in a jail, but not all will be incarcerated in
a prison. This means that legislation which might abolish segregation in prisons while the practice may legitimately
remain in jails. While the reverse is also true, the gap is less for jail reform as many persons in jails will never enter
a prison.
46
Statistics Canada, “Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2017/2018” (9 May 2019), online: <
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.htm> [perma.cc/C2ZC-SKEJ]. The approach
40
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tiered system of incarceration are present in myriad ways. In addition to the complexity in
addressing conditions of confinement presented by the separate and distinct laws governing
them, many organizations working with prisoners and prisoners themselves are acutely aware of
the lack of resources made available in jails on the basis that people in them are not in need of
rehabilitation due to the uncertainty of their guilt. 47 Despite such differences, a commonality
shared by both federal and provincial detention is the use of solitary confinement as a tool for
regulation of prisoners. The legislative controls governing these processes are outlined below,
with particular attention to Bill C-83.
The recently adopted Bill C-83 amends the federal Correctional and Conditional Release
Act (CCRA),48 which provides rules on the use of segregation in federal prisons. The provincial
Correctional Services and Reintegration Act (CSRA)49 and regulations of the Ministry of
Correctional Services Act (MCSA)50 establish a similar but distinct set of discretionary powers
on the use of segregation in Ontario jails. Bill 6, the Correctional Services Transformation Act,51
which repeals existing powers over segregation in the MCSA and CSRA in order to substantially
limit its use, received royal assent on 7 May 2018.52 However, since the Conservative
government came into power in June of 2018, the Bill has not been listed with forthcoming
Ontario Proclamations, meaning that it is not scheduled to come into force and could remain
dormant for up to ten years.53 As such, Bill 6 is on the cusp of implementing reforms that could
see a significant reform of solitary confinement as it exists in Ontario today while newly
implemented reforms of Bill C-83 are being introduced across Ontario-based prisons.
Interestingly, these parallel Bills adopt very different and, in some ways, conflicting approaches
to segregation reform.
It is important to note that both Bill C-83 and the Bill 6 emerged following years of
advocacy that saw the development and adoption of the Mandela Rules by the United Nations in
2015. The purpose of this set of rules is to set a minimum standard of treatment for prisoners
internationally. In addition to minimum standards on the use of solitary confinement, food
provision, medical treatment, conditions of climate, and administration of records and
overcrowding are outlined by these rules in order to prevent harms that have been established as
a direct result of incarceration. Specifically, Rule 45(2) prohibits the use of solitary confinement
adopted in this article sees all usage of solitary confinement as harmful, regardless of a verdict of guilt or innocence.
While the disparity in the number of people found guilty and on remand is helpful to providing context to the
division between federal and provincial institutions, it is not meant to assert that the degree to which a person has
become criminalized renders them more of less deserving for what the Mandela Rules have deemed to be torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.
47
Speight et al, “Jail Accountability and Information Hotline Quarterly Report” (March 2019), online: <https://cpep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Jail-Hotline_Q2-Report_Final.pdf> [perma.cc/SN2H-CKC7] at 15.
48
Corrections and Conditional Release Act SC 1992, c 20 at s 31.
49
Correctional Services and Reintegration Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 6, Sched 2.
50
Ministry of Correctional Services Act RSO 1990, c M-22 at s 34.
51
Bill 6, Correctional Services Transformation Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 6.
52
Appendix B provides a helpful overview of the federal and provincial legislative reform timelines that will be
discussed in this section.
53
Bills passed by the Ontario Legislature may require proclamation by the Lieutenant Governor before coming into
effect, even after royal assent is received. This is true of Bill 6. Currently, Bill 6 has no listed date to receive
proclamation. Bills essentially sit in limbo for up to ten years before action is required, meaning that although Bill 6
has received royal assent, it may not come into effect for several years. Critics have suggested that the Ford
Government is influencing this delay. For Ontario forthcoming proclamations see: Ontario Proclamations, online:
<www.ontario.ca/laws/proclamations> [perma.cc/3DEN-TLK2].
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for prisoners “with mental or physical disabilities when their conditions would be exacerbated by
such measures.”54 While Canada is a member of the General Assembly, which adopted this set of
rules in 2015, counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario later took the position with respect to
solitary confinement that: “It’s not that they’re irrelevant, they are relevant, and they are a source
of information … that you can look to, to assist you in determining what you conclude are the
constitutional obligations.”55 In other words, the Canadian state is in agreement that such
minimum standards should exist, but objects to being held accountable to meeting them. No
domestic or international tribunal exists to enforce the Mandela Rules, which allows Canada and
Ontario to symbolically agree to these standards without accountability.
Following recommendations made by the Howard Sapers Report, Bill 6 (the Correctional
Services Transformation Act) takes a radically different approach than federal Bill C-83 to
solitary confinement in Ontario jails. The Bill overturns pre-existing discretionary powers of jail
staff by setting hard deadlines on the amount of time a prisoner can be placed in solitary
confinement, setting the cap at fifteen days, in compliance with the Mandela Rules and the
Ontario Court of Appeal decision in CCLA.56 The number of allowable aggregate days in a 365day period is set at sixty, following the Jahn Settlement agreement and the Howard Sapers’
Report recommendations.57 In further compliance of these recommendations, Bill 6 prohibits the
use of segregation for prisoners with mental health issues.58 The Bill 6 definition of segregation
remains the same as it previously was: “any type of custody where an inmate is highly restricted
in movement and associate with others for 22 hours or more a day.”59 This definition might have
been trivial but for the introduction of Bill C-83, which hinges its reforms on the number of
hours spent in solitude.
Unlike Bill 6, which approaches the ongoing harms of solitary confinement by limiting
discretion of its use, Bill C-83 attempts to address the issue by changing the way that solitary is
experienced, without providing a hard limit on the frequency or overall duration of its
application. Rather, Bill C-83 introduces what are called “structured intervention units” in place
of solitary confinement cells. 60 One of the central features of these units is that prisoners must
spend at least four hours a day outside of them, two of which must allow for social interaction. 61
While this does mark a welcomed improvement to the twenty-two hours of solitary confinement
permitted prior to the implementation of Bill C-83, it is quite a leap to suggest, as the
government does, that the remaining twenty hours no longer constitutes solitary confinement.
Despite language in the Mandela Rules and as defined by the CCLA decision, which defines
solitary confinement as twenty-two hours a day of confinement, it is well-established that the
harms to mental health resultant from solitary confinement are predicated on sensory
deprivation, and such harms are not removed by providing two fewer daily hours of sensory

54

Mandela Rules, supra note 26 at 45(2).
Sunny Dhillon, “UN solitary-confinement rules aren't binding in Canadian prisons, Attorney-General lawyer
says,” Globe and Mail, (31 August 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/un-solitaryconfinement-rules-dont-apply-to-canadian-prisons-attorney-general-lawyer-says/article36142330/>
[perma.cc/MFP2-ZPAB].
56
Bill C-83, supra note 9.
57
Sapers, supra note 4 and Bill C-83, supra note 9.
58
Bill 6, supra note 51 at s 65(3)(c), (d).
59
Ibid at Part I.
60
Bill c-83, supra note 9 at s 31.1(1).
61
Ibid at s 36.
55
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deprivation.62 It is the absence of sensory stimulation for prolonged periods of time that erodes
mental health and is known to cause “appetite and sleep disturbances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss
of control, paranoia, hallucinations and self-mutilations.”63 Although two less hours a day
experiencing sensory deficit may partially mitigate the severity of harms caused by solitary
confinement, it does not eradicate them. 64 As such, while Bill C-83 may provide the potential for
solitary confinement to cause slightly less harm to mental health, the scope of how much less
harm, if any less at all, has yet to be fully assessed.
Unlike Bill 6 which strictly prohibits solitary confinement of prisoners with mental health
issues, the confinement of mentally ill prisoners alone in “structured intervention units” for
twenty hours a day is allowable under Bill C-83 with the provision that prisoners are visited daily
by a registered health care professional. 65 More specifically, section 37.1(2) states that mental
health assessments, performed by a registered health care professional, will take place “within 24
hours after the inmate’s transfer into the structured intervention unit” and a visit to the inmate
will occur “at least once every day by a registered health care professional.”66 Should the
outcome of a mental health assessment be that “confinement of an inmate in a structured
intervention unit is having detrimental impacts on the inmate’s health,” the institutional head
determines whether conditions in the unit should be altered or whether the inmate should remain
in the unit.67 Should the institutional head decide that the prisoner must remain in the unit,
despite the ongoing harms, this decision will then be reviewed by an external committee,
consisting of a staff of the Service, who will be provided information by a different healthcare
professional that they may opt to reject.68 In the event that the committee determines that a
prisoner should remain in the unit or that the conditions of confinement in the unit should not be
altered, an independent external decision maker shall be appointed to make a final
determination.69 The only qualification for this decision maker is that they have “knowledge of
administrative decision-making processes in general.” 70 All this is to say that should a mental
health professional find that a prisoner is experiencing mental health harms so significant that
they must be taken out of a structured intervention unit, a multi-layered bureaucratic process will
begin. At no point in this process is any action required that would treat the harms caused by
solitary confinement. Rather, a healthcare professional, many of whom are barely able to
complete daily tasks due to such heavy workloads, 71 must advocate to the institutional head on
behalf of the prisoner that they be removed from circumstances which are well-established to
cause harms to mental health. For the duration of this decision-making process, the prisoner will
continue to be held in the structured intervention unit/solitary cell.
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An inherently worrisome feature of Bill C-83 is that the Commission “may designate a
penitentiary or any area in a penitentiary to be a structured intervention unit.”72 The critique that
Senator Pate and other prisoners’ rights advocates have advanced is that structured intervention
units will likely be the exact same units that were previously named solitary confinement cells. 73
With absolutely no required changes to the cells, it is unclear what will differentiate them. Had
Bill C-83 included requirements for these units (windows, access to literature, TV and radio, size
requirements, access to lighting options, et cetera) there may have been some optimism around
the statutory amendments.
While Bill C-83 has the potential to alter how prisoners experience solitary confinement
in Canada, it falls short of meeting recommendations of the Howard Sapers Report and distorts
the length of time that is spent in structured intervention units such that the decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in CCLA and the requirements set out by the UN in the Mandela rules
appear to have been met since prisoners spend two fewer hours daily in solitary confinement.
Yet, Bill C-83 only requires the review of solitary confinement in structured intervention units
after thirty days, double the maximum set by the Mandela rules and the decision by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in CCLA.74 Further, the shift towards monitoring mental health does not prevent
the harms that are caused by placing prisoners with mental health issues in solitary confinement.
Rather, it retroactively engages prisoners in what could become a lengthy battle to be removed
from solitary confinement conditions actively causing harms to mental health.
As evidenced by the experiences of Cas Geddes, Ashley Smith, Christina Jahn, and
Adam Capay,75 prisoners who complain of mental health concerns or exhibit potentially violent
forms of distress caused by mental health issues are known to be placed in segregation as a
response. The result is a cyclical effect of exacerbating the underlying mental health issues
causing the use of segregation by implementing terms of segregation. In addition to removing
prisoners from solitary confinement, an effective reform must also treat their mental health and
the effects caused by prolonged solitary confinement.76 Daily visits by healthcare professionals 77
only react to harms directly caused by segregation without providing treatment or preventing
them from occurring. The only “treatment” required by the Bill is the removal of prisoners from
solitary confinement should the potentially lengthy process, outlined through ss 31-37, be
successful. Given the large body of data regarding the severe harms to mental health caused by
solitary confinement, and international rules limiting its use, this can hardly be considered
treatment.
Although Bill C-83 does not dramatically alter the conditions of solitary confinement or
the broad powers of correctional staff to implement it, correctional officers’ unions have raised
concerns that without the power to completely isolate prisoners, instances of violence will rise. 78
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However, Bill C-83 maintains these powers through the provision that the institutional head, as
well as the internal committee, have the right to supersede decisions with respect to mental
health concerns should removal from solitary confinement “jeopardize the safety of the inmate or
any other person or the security of the penitentiary” or “interfere with an investigation that could
lead to a criminal charge.”79 As such, correctional staff have the power to override mental health
concerns and implement solitary confinement through the use of structured intervention units
where safety is of concern. 80
On its face, Bill C-83 falls short of meeting recommendations made by the Howard
Sapers’ Report, the Ashley Smith Inquest, the Jahn Settlement, the Adam Capay stay order, and
the CCLA decision, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal, as noted earlier, clearly articulates that
“administrative segregation longer than 15 consecutive days … violates s. 12 of the Charter.”81
As Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale suggested prior to the Bill’s passage, the Liberal
government believes Bill C-83 meets the Ontario Court of Appeal orders by eliminating solitary
confinement altogether. 82 As discussed earlier, the approach of the Bill misses the mark by
reorganizing solitary confinement into structured intervention units, which are likely to
perpetuate existing problems, particularly for people with mental health issues. While the Bill
provides for less time to be spent in these units, reducing hours from twenty-two to twenty, this
decrease is not likely to dramatically reduce the negative impacts of solitary confinement on
mental health. Rather, it skirts the legal definitions of solitary confinement which have been
named by the Mandela Rules and the CCLA decision to be twenty hours. Drawing from
contemporary literature on topics of solitary confinement and mental health, the following
section of this article investigates potential consequences of Bill C-83’s future implementation.

IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF BILL C-83
In a critique of CCRA oversight of the use of segregation in women’s prisons in Canada, Lisa
Kerr highlights instances where strict readings of the Act’s provisions around discretionary
powers over the administration of segregation have been applied as a tool to legitimize internal
institutional policies that conflict with the Act’s overarching goal of supporting rehabilitation.83
In this section, Bill C-83 is considered in light of Kerr’s analysis of the limitations of the Act in
providing meaningful oversight of its administrative applications of solitary confinement to
internal prison policies. While Kerr’s work reveals the limitations of legislation, the work of
Debra Parkes, a leading scholar in Canadian prison law and solitary confinement, highlights the
failure of Canadian courts in addressing the harms of segregation for mentally ill prisoners,
effectively ignoring UN obligations under the Mandela Rules. 84 Parkes’ work on the topic will
79
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inform the analysis of Bill C-83 in light of the recent CCLA decision. Finally, the work of
Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster, analyzing political influence over prison policies in Canada,
is considered to discern potential broader outcomes.85
Kerr’s analysis of segregation protocols developed under the CCRA prior to the Bill C-83
amendments suggests the importance of assessing the extent to which those responsible for the
Act’s implementation may manipulate its language to support policies that conflict with the
overarching goal of limiting the use of segregation. Kerr also warns that the space that the CCRA
is implemented within—prisons and jails—must also be considered for their inaccessibility to
public scrutiny.86 Given that the Bill C-83 amendments will see mandatory reforms from the use
of segregation (twenty-two hours per day) to “structured intervention units” (twenty hour per
day), it is inevitable that these institutions will be required to modify existing protocols. The
discretion contained in sections 31 and 34 of Bill C-83 suggests that deeply troubling outcomes
are possible. For example, as noted earlier section 31 provides that the Commissioner “may
designate a penitentiary or any area in a penitentiary to be a structured intervention unit.” 87 Many
prisons and jails in Canada are several decades old and struggling to manage overcrowding and
understaffing problems.88 Providing such discretion on the space that can be deemed a
“structured intervention unit” may even regress the current state of segregation cells. While it is
entirely possible that structured intervention units will be the exact same units previously used as
solitary confinement cells, it is also possible that new or restructured jails and prisons may use
even smaller or less appealing spaces as “structured intervention units,” which more
conveniently accommodate four hours of daily release. Similarly troubling are the continued
discretionary powers afforded in decisions regarding the use and continued application of
solitary confinement for prisoners, which require reassessment only after thirty days, should
mental health assessments not give rise to further administrative action.
For prisoners with mental health issues, Bill C-83 does little to improve conditions.
Instead of preventing the many known harms resulting from placing those with mental health
issues into solitary confinement, the Bill increases visitation by health care professionals, with
very little obligation on such professionals or correctional staff to take positive action.89 Action
is required by staff members only if they believe confinement in a structured intervention unit is
having detrimental effects, such as a prisoner committing an act of self-harm, refusing to interact
socially, a drug overdose, or some other medical emergency. 90 But this required “action” consists
only of referring the prisoner’s case to those responsible for administering health care. Although
monitoring of mental health is increased, it does not necessarily increase the medical care
required to improve it. Rather, health care professionals are likely to observe as the harms of
solitary confinement take effect on prisoners, without support for action until one of the medical
emergencies listed above has already occurred.
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Given the trend of Correctional Service of Canada’s apparent (CSC) reluctance to take
action, Parkes has criticized courts for taking a “hands off” approach to correctional decisionmaking, particularly in the matter of mental health and segregation. 91 Parkes describes the 1975
decision, McCann v The Queen, as a pivotal moment where the Federal Court first acknowledged
harms resultant from solitary confinement, yet does little to advance change. Specifically, the
court ruled that extended use of solitary confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in contravention of section 2(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Several important factors should
be considered in reflecting on this case. First, no subsequent legal reforms followed from the
decision. While the court felt it should give practical guidance with respect to institutional
practices, the decision did not render a specific piece of legislation or policy in contravention of
the Bill of Rights, only actions undertaken at the institution. Secondly, the decision reacted to the
harms that prisoners experienced well after such harms had taken effect and forever changed
their lives, exemplifying the reactive nature of courts which often does little to prevent harm.
Notably, the prisoners in this case experienced decades of abuse while in solitary confinement
and a plethora of horrific suicides occurred before any acknowledgement took place. 92 The
harms that were endured by these prisoners were addressed far too late, with many having
suffered irreversible harms to mental health. Finally, the prisoners in this case were only able to
access legal support and resources on a pro bono basis following a very public escape by one
prisoner who leaked information with respect to his inhumane treatment to the media. For the
majority of prisoners, financial resources to access legal support will entirely prevent any
meaningful action or remedy.
Decades later, BobbyLee Worm, an Indigenous woman incarcerated at the age of
nineteen who experienced years of solitary confinement was successful in a claim against the
institution she was held in. As Parkes explains, however, despite a settlement which abolished
the protocol that had enabled Worm’s prolonged solitary confinement, young Indigenous women
at the institution continued to experience the same result. 93 Although courts, in this case, did
react to policies enabling the use of solitary confinement, there was no continued oversight to
monitor compliance. Similarly to the McCann decision, Worm faced extreme harms before the
court acknowledged wrongdoing. Additionally, had it not been for the availability of pro bono
legal resources, Worm would not have had access to any remedy at all. Such a “hands off”
approach by the courts is especially problematic considering Kerr’s work which establishes that
internal policies of correctional institutions are often not reflective of the CCRA mandate. The
result is that many prisoners continue to experience the harms resultant from solitary
confinement, despite legal decisions which have attempted to eradicate its harmful use.
Parkes also discusses more recent cases where applications of habeus corpus were
brought to prevent the harms of solitary confinement. Specifically, in the Bacon v Surrey Pretrial
Services Centre (Warden) decision a BC Superior Court deemed the conditions of solitary
confinement to be “significantly threatening to psychological integrity” and “deplorable in any
civilized society, and certainly unworthy of ours.”94 Unfortunately, however, the Court refused to
characterize segregation as cruel and unusual punishment per se.95 The recent CCLA decision
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exemplifies a similar pattern in judicial reluctance to address mental health in Canadian prisons.
Here, the Court states:
In principle, I agree with the CCLA that those with mental illness should not be
placed in administrative segregation. However, the evidence does not provide the
court with a meaningful way to identify those inmates whose particular mental
illnesses are of such a kind as to render administrative segregation for any length of
time cruel and unusual. I take some comfort in my view that a cap of 15 days would
reduce the risk of harm to inmates who suffer from mental illness.96
As Parkes demonstrates, the reluctance of courts to address mental health and segregation
directly results in severe ongoing harms. The implementation of Bill C-83 continues this trend by
ignoring the known harms caused by solitary confinement and instead placing minimal
restrictions upon its use.
These minimal restrictions, coupled with a “hands off” approach to implementation and
oversight, yield the result that Parkes’ 2017 research warns Canadian legal professionals about.
Parkes suggests legal professionals ought to be cautious of legal decisions sparking legislative
reforms to solitary confinement, following trends in American reforms in the 1970s, which saw
“states buil[d] new solitary confinement units that met the minimum standards for space, light,
and other amenities required by courts.”97 Such action is arguably exactly the situation that Bill
C-83 has created by implementing only the minimum standards required to absolve government
of accountability, while still not addressing the overarching harms caused by lacing people with
mental health issues in solitary confinement. In doing so, the Bill threatens to put much of the
work of lawyers advocating against solitary confinement for prisoners with mental health issues
to waste. This is because in preparing the evidentiary record, the many expert reports compiled
for cases like the CCLA class action and Bacon relied on practices of segregation that permit
twenty-two hours of solitary confinement per day. As noted, Bill C-83 permits twenty hours/day
in “structured intervention units,” with two mandatory hours of socialization, and this may well
require the gathering of new data and analyses. This exemplifies the sort of challenges that
Parkes describes in Canadian jurisprudence to completely abolish segregation for mentally ill
prisoners.
Doob and Webster describe the shift in policies since the federal election of Harper’s
Conservative government in 2006 as one following a punitive vision of criminal justice. 98 The
inclination of Conservative governments towards tough on crime and pro-punishment initiatives
is an important consideration when assessing broader political implications of Bill C-83,
particularly at the Ontario Legislature. Ford’s Conservative government in Ontario, among many
other cuts, has not renewed Howard Sapers’ contract, leaving the position on jail oversight
vacant. As discussed above, the proclamation of Bill 6, which would set a cap of fifteen days on
segregation, has also been indefinitely shelved. No information is available on when the
Lieutenant Governor might address it. Now that Bill C-83 is federal law, the logic it applies (of
structured intervention units rather than solitary confinement cells) could be utilized by the Ford
administration as justification to repeal the forthcoming reforms of Bill 6, effectively reversing a
decade of advocacy for reform in this area. Further, Bill C-83 provides a similar justification for
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other provinces struggling to address issues of solitary confinement and mental health by
redefining solitary cells as “structured intervention units” used for only twenty hours/day.

V. CONCLUSION
The parallel, yet distinct, layers of federal and provincial oversight of Ontario carceral
institutions complicate advocacy aimed at preventing the harms resulting from segregating
prisoners with mental health issues. Bill C-83 reforms create a dangerous precedent in which
solitary confinement “under another name” (structured intervention units) is permitted to hold
prisoners with mental health issues for otherwise unacceptable periods of time. 99 Furthermore,
the Bill conflates monitoring and responding to harms to mental health caused by solitary
confinement with preventing or treating it. If such logic is applied to oversight of mental health
in prisons more broadly, research and evidence suggests that increased harms will follow. 100 In
this crucial moment of prisoners’ justice reform, Bill C-83 threatens to undo many years of
advocacy efforts and research predicated on the definition of solitary confinement as isolation for
twenty-two hours, particularly in Ontario where the positive reforms of Bill 6 were on the cusp
of being adopted. The CCLA decision will play a pivotal role in the future of solitary
confinement in Canada, especially for those living with mental health issues. However, given the
recent passage of Bill C-83, many of the arguments relied on by the CCLA are at risk of
challenge, particularly given the Minister of Public Safety’s view that solitary confinement has
been entirely eradicated. 101 As such, it is proposed here that while Bill C-83 has the potential to
reduce some of the harms to mental health caused by solitary confinement, it threatens to follow
American trends in solitary confinement reforms and undo many years of advocacy by
reorganizing similar conditions under another name and falsely concluding that solitary
confinement has been eliminated.
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APPENDIX A
Current Psychiatric Oversight Measures for Prisoners in Solitary Confinement in Ontario Jails
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APPENDIX B

Timelines of Major Events Leading to Bill C-83
*grey squares represent provincial level actions, white squares represent federal level action
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